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INTRODUCTION
This "Lending Scorecard" is the first of a planned series of
annual reports on residential real estate-related lending,2 conventional
home mortgage lending,3 and small business lending4 to minority and
low- and moderate-income (LMI) persons and neighborhoods in the
New York metropolitan area (New York or the metropolitan area).5
Since 1991, when disclosure of detailed data about lending in these
communities showed that their credit needs were not being met,
government officials, community groups, and lenders have worked to
increase the availability of credit in these communities. 6 The purpose
of this annual Scorecard is to measure the progress of their efforts
each year. The Scorecard will provide the information necessary for
lenders, government officials, community groups, borrowers, and
other interested parties to develop policies, programs, and strategies to
ensure that credit is equally available to minority and low-income
persons and communities.
1 Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank Vicki Hurewitz
for creating the computer program that allowed me to analyze lending data. Without her
assistance, this Scorecard would not have been possible. I also thank Jean Marie Brescia
and Carol Buckler for reviewing earlier drafts and Cathy Jenkins for her hard work and
patience. Finally, I thank New York Law School for its support of my research.
2 This Scorecard defines "residential real estate-related lending" to include
government-insured home mortgage loans, conventional home mortgage loans, home
mortgage refinance loans, and home improvement loans for residential real estate.
3 This Scorecard defines "conventional home mortgage lending" to include
loans to purchase a one-to-four family residential property, excluding government-insured
loans.
4 This Scorecard defines "small business lending" to include loans to
business with $1 million or less in gross annual revenue.
5 More specifically, the Scorecard covers Metropolitan Statistical Area 5600
(MSA 5600), which includes eight counties: the Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens,
Richmond, Rockland, Putnam, and Westchester.
6 See Richard Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effects of
Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing, Lending and Discrimination
in the New York Metropolitan Area, 27 FORD. URB. L.J. 481 (1999).
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The Scorecard is divided into two parts. Part One examines
aggregate residential real estate-related lending, conventional home
mortgage lending, and small business lending to minority and low-
income persons and neighborhoods in the New York metropolitan
area in 1998, the latest year for which data about such lending are
available, by all lenders that are required to report such data.7 Part
7 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810
(1999), requires lenders, including "depository institutions" and "other lending
institutions," to disclose certain information about their residential real estate-related
lending. Depository institutions, including banks, savings associations, and credit unions,
that as of the end of 1998 had assets of at least $28 million and a home or branch office in
an MSA, were required to report under HMDA. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2802(2), 2803(a)(1),
§2808(b) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a) (1999). In 1998 "other lending institutions"
included "any person engaged for profit in the business of mortgage lending," provided
they had at least $10 million in assets or made 100 loans the previous year. 12 U.S.C. §
2802(2)(B), (4)(1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(2) (1999).
HMDA requires lenders to report information about four different types of
residential real estate-related loans: 1) conventional home mortgage loans; 2) federally
insured home mortgage loans; 3) home mortgage refinance loans; and 4) home
improvement loans. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(A) (1999); 12 C.F.R. pt.
203, app. A, §§ V.A. 3-4 (1999).
HMDA also requires lenders to report whether the property that is the subject
of the application has four or fewer residential units or more than four residential units.
12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, §§ V.A. 4-5 (1999). If the property has four or fewer
residential units, HMDA requires the lender to report whether the property is owner-
occupied. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(2) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(3).
For each of the four types of residential real-estate loans HMDA covers,
lenders must report: 1) the number of applications received; 2) the race, income, and
gender of each applicant; 3) the census tract in which the property that was the subject of
the loan application is located; and 4) the disposition of each application, including loan
originated, application denied, application approved but applicant turned down the loan,
application withdrawn, or file closed because incomplete. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4)
(1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a).
Regulations promulgated under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12
U.S.C. §§2901-2906 (1999), require banks with assets of $250 million or more to report
certain information about their small business loans: 1) the loan amount; 2) the census
tract in which the business that received the loan is located; and 3) whether the business
had gross annual revenue of $1 million or less. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.42 (a) (1999).
Small business loans are defined as business loans with original amounts of $1 million or
less. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.11 (u) (1999). This regulation incorporates the definition
of small business loans in the instructions to banks for preparing their Consolidated
Report of Condition and Income. These instructions can be found at the website of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See (visited Apr. 13, 2000)
<http://www.fdic.gov/CALL_TFRrpts/tocc>. The CRA small business loan disclosure
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Two of the Scorecard turns its attention to the record of individual
lenders in 1998. It examines the conventional home mortgage lending
record to minority and LMI persons and neighborhoods of each of the
154 lenders in the New York metropolitan area that made at least 30
conventional home mortgage loans in New York, assigns a score
based on that record, and ranks the lenders accordingly.
8
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Overall, 1998 saw increases in lending to LMI and minority
persons and neighborhoods that outpaced increases to White and
upper-income (UI) persons in the New York metropolitan area. LMI
and minority persons and residents of such neighborhoods in the New
York metropolitan area filed more residential real estate-related and
conventional home mortgage loan applications and received more
loans than in 1997. These increases generally were relatively greater
than application and lending increases for White and UI persons and
neighborhoods. Small business lending in LMI neighborhoods
increased in 1998 and the increase was greater in LMI neighborhoods
than in UI neighborhoods. Despite this overall increase, there are
several reasons for concern. Minority individuals did not fare as well
as Whites in the conventional home mortgage market. Lenders
rejected residential real estate-related loan applications and
conventional home mortgage loan applications from LMI and
minority persons and neighborhoods more frequently than from White
and UI persons and neighborhoods, although the differential declined
slightly in 1998. Denial rates for minority individuals and
predominantly minority neighborhoods were high compared to denial
rates for Whites and White neighborhoods.
As for individual lenders, the Scorecard shows several
regulations do not require lenders that are not banks to disclose small business lending
data because the CRA covers only banks. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.1 l(c) (1999).
8 Together, these lenders made 57,333 conventional home mortgage loans, or
97 percent of all conventional home mortgage loans in the New York metropolitan area in
1998. See infra Table 12 and note 32 for the source of this data. For a description of the
scoring system, see infra Section II.
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interesting results. First, of the 154 lenders represented in the
Scorecard, 97 are lenders that are not banks (non-bank lenders),
representing 52.7 percent of all loans covered by the Scorecard,
compared to 57 banks, responsible for 47.3 percent of loans analyzed
in the Scorecard. Second, 24 of the 154 lenders, representing 8.9
percent of loans covered in the Scorecard, were so-called "subprime"
lenders, meaning they specialize in lending to individuals with less
than "A" credit ratings.9  Although subprime lenders serve an
important function by providing credit to borrowers who might
otherwise be denied it, many subprime lenders have been accused of
abusive and discriminatory lending practices. 10 Third, non-bank
lenders outperformed banks in conventional home mortgage lending
to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods, and subprime
lenders outperformed both banks and non-bank lenders. To the extent
that some subprime lenders may be engaging in illegal lending
practices, this result tempers the apparent good news that lending to
LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods outgrew lending to
White and UI persons and neighborhoods. Finally, several large
banks and mortgage companies did not fare well in the ratings. These
include Chase* Manhattan Bank (-4/77), 1  Republic Bancorp
Mortgage, Inc. (-4/77), Dime Savings Bank of New York (-6/86), The
Bank of New York Mortgage Co. (-8/90), Bank of America (-12/100),
Astoria Federal Savings (-14/115), Fleet Mortgage Corp. (-14/115),
Staten Island Savings Bank (-16/126), Citibank (-18/139), M&T
Mortgage Corp. (-18/139), and Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. (-20/152).
9 Two of these 24 lenders specialized in making loans to purchase
manufactured homes. For purposes of analysis, the Scorecard combines these two
manufactured home lenders with subprime lenders. The reasons for this are explained
more fully infra note 34.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
1 The numbers in the parenthesis represent the lender's score and its ranking
out of the 154 lenders in the Scorecard. Several lenders share the same score and
ranking, meaning that their performances in lending to minority and LMI persons and
neighborhoods was similar. See Infra Section II for a description of the scoring system.
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2000] LENDING SCORECARD 773
I. RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE-RELATED LENDING, CONVENTIONAL
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA, 1997-1998
A. Residential Real Estate-Related Lending
1. Methodology
This section examines aggregate residential real estate-related
lending by all lenders in the New York metropolitan area who were
required to report such lending in 1998.12 Residential real estate-
related lending includes government-insured home mortgage loans,
conventional home mortgage loans, home mortgage refinance loans,
home improvement loans, and multi-family housing loans. This
section measures residential real estate-related lending in and to four
"subject communities": minority persons; 13  LMI persons; 14
predominantly minority neighborhoods;' 5 and LMI neighborhoods.
16
This section compares changes in real estate-related lending in these
12 The source of data for this section is the website of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), where HMDA data is posted. See FFIEC
Website (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.ffiec.gov>.
13 The Scorecard defines minority persons to include all the racial categories
reported under HMDA except "White." These are "American Indian or Alaskan Native,"
"Asian or Pacific Islander," "Black," and "Hispanic." See HMDA, RAWDATA 3 (1999).
14 The Scorecard defines an LMI person the same way as the FFIEC does
when it reports HMDA data: a person with an income of less than 80 percent of the MSA
median income. See, e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Disclosure Statement:
Explanation of Notes (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda~rpt/
notes.html>. See also 12 C.F.R. § 25.12(n)(1) (1999).
15 The Scorecard defines a predominantly minority neighborhood as a census
tract that has a minority population of 80 percent or greater. This definition corresponds
to the way the FFIEC reports HMDA data. See, e.g., Business and Financial Statistics,
85 Fed. Res. Bull. A65, tbl. 4.37 (1999).
16 The Scorecard defines an LMI neighborhood the same way as the FFIEC
does when it reports HMDA data: a census tract that has a median family income of less
than 80 percent of the MSA median income. See Home Mortgage Act Disclosure
Statement: Explanation of Notes, supra note 14.
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four subject communities from 1997 to 1998 to changes in such
lending in their "control communities," which are, respectively, White
persons, UI persons,17 predominantly White neighborhoods, 8 and UI
neighborhoods.'
9
The Scorecard employs three indicators to evaluate changes in
residential real estate-related lending in the four subject communities
in New York in 1998:
*Comparative percentage change in total
residential real estate-related loan applications
submitted: This indicator compares the percentage
change in the total number of residential real estate-
related loan applications each subject community
submitted from 1997 to 1998 to the percentage change
in each subject community's control community.20
*Comparative percentage change in total
residential real estate-related loans originated: This
indicator compares the percentage change in the total
number of residential real estate-related loan
originations in each subject community from 1997 to
1998 to the percentage change in each subject
community's control community.
*Change in denial rate ratio: This indicator
17 The Scorecard defines a UI person the same way as the FFIEC does when
it reports HMDA data: a person with an income of 120 percent or higher of the MSA
median income. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Disclosure Statement: Explanation
of Notes, supra note 14.
18 In order to be consistent with the definition of a predominantly minority
neighborhood, this Scorecard defines a predominantly White neighborhood as the
opposite of a predominantly minority neighborhood: a census tract with a White
population of 80 percent or higher. See supra note 15.
19 The Scorecard defines a UI neighborhood the same way as the FFIEC does
when it reports HMDA data: a census tract with a median income of 120 percent or
higher of the MSA median income. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Disclosure
Statement: Explanation of Notes, supra note 14.
20 The number of applications a community submits is a good indicator of
lenders' efforts to market loans to that community and has a strong relation to the number
of loans the community receives. See Marsico, supra note 6, at 525-26.
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measures the change in the real estate-related loan
application denial rate ratio in each subject
community from 1997 to 1998.
21
The Scorecard applies these three indicators to the four
subject communities, resulting in twelve indicators to evaluate
residential real estate-related lending in the subject communities in
the New York metropolitan area in 1988:
Percentage Change in Applications Submitted, 1997-1998
1. Minority/White individuals
2. LMI/UI individuals
3. Predominantly minority/Predominantly White
neighborhoods
4. LMI/UI neighborhoods
Percentage Change in Loans Originated, 1997-1998
5. Minority/White individuals
6. LMIIUI individuals
7. Predominantly minority/Predominantly White
neighborhoods
8. LMI/UI neighborhoods
Change in Denial Rate Ratio, 1997-1998
9. Minority/White applicants
21 A denial rate ratio is a way of measuring lenders' relative treatment of
applications from a subject community to its control community. See id. at 488. The
Scorecard derives the denial rate ratio by dividing the denial rate for applications from a
subject community by the denial rate for applications from its control community. For
example, if lenders deny 30 percent of applications from minority persons and 15 percent
of applications from Whites, the denial rate ratio is 2 (30/15=2). A high denial rate ratio
for a minority subject community is consistent with discrimination against that group.
See id. at 516-517. However, the HMDA data that is the basis for calculating the denial
rate ratio does not contain enough data about the creditworthiness of the borrower or the
value of the collateral to make a definitive conclusion about discrimination. See id. For
example, HMDA does not contain information about the applicant's credit or
employment histories or debt-to-income ratio. Nor does it contain information about the
appraised value of the property that is the subject of the application. See id Despite
HMDA's limitations, reductions in denial rate ratios have been shown to be consistent
with increases in lending. See id. at 525.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
10. LMI/UI applicants
11. Predominantly minority/Predominantly White
neighborhoods
12. LMI/UI neighborhoods
The Scorecard assigns a score to each of the twelve indicators.
There are three possible scores: "+1," 64-1," or "0." The score for
applications and loan originations is based on the percentage change
in the number of applications from and loan originations to a subject
community from 1997 to 1998 relative to the percentage change in its
control community. If the percentage increase in the number of
applications from or loan originations to a subject community was
higher (or the percentage decrease was lower) than its control
community, the score is +1. If the reverse occurred, the score is -1. If
there was no change, the score is 0. For the denial rate ratio, if the
denial rate ratio in a subject community decreased from 1997 to 1998,
the score is +1. An increased denial rate ratio is -1, and no change in
the denial rate ratio is 0. For example, if the number of residential
real estate-related loans originated to minority individuals increased
10 percent from 1997 to 1998 and the number of residential real
estate-related loans originated to White individuals increased 8
percent, the score is +1 for that indicator. If the denial rate ratio for
minorities decreased from 1.9 to 1.8, the score is also +1. The
Scorecard tabulates the score for all the indicators to derive a total
score for residential real estate-related lending in the New York
metropolitan area in 1998.
2. Results
Table One is the "Scorecard" for residential real estate-related
lending in 1998 in the New York metropolitan area:
776 [Vol. XVI
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Table One
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE-RELATED LENDING SCORECARD
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
SUBJECT APPLICATIONS ORIGINATIONS DENIAL RATE TOTAL
COMMUNITY i
Minority Individuals +1 +1 0 +2
LMI Individuals +1 +1 • 0 +2
Predominantly
Minority -1 +1 +1 +1
Neighborhoods
LMI -1 +1 0 0
Neighborhoods
Total 0 +4 +1 +5
As more fully elaborated in Tables Two, Three and Four, the
number of residential real estate-related loan applications filed and
loans originated increased significantly for all communities from 1997
to 1998. The score for residential real estate-related lending in the
subject communities is +5, meaning that generally these increases
were greater in the subject communities than in their corresponding
control communities and that denial rate ratios declined or were
stable.
Among the subject communities, LMI. and minority
individuals fared the best, with scores of +2. Applications and loans
increased at faster rates than in their control communities and denial
rate ratios remained stable. Predominantly minority neighborhoods
were next with +1, as applications grew more slowly than in White
neighborhoods but loans grew faster and the denial rate ratio declined.
LMI neighborhoods scored 0. Application growth was slower than in
UI neighborhoods, but loan growth was greater and the denial rate
ratio remained the same.
Table Two expands on the Scorecard by showing the actual
number of residential real estate-related loan applications each subject
and control community submitted in 1997 and 1998, the percentage
778 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI
increase, and the score:
22
Table Two
RESIDENTIAL REAL-ESTATE RELATED LENDING
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
1997 1998 % CHANGE 1-
APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS
Minority 43,766 69,403 58.6 +1
White 70,911 108,381 52.8
LMI 26,657 42,620 59.9 +1
UI 93,058 138,028 48.3
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
80-100% Min. 48,190 73,765 53.1 1
0-19% Min. 78,197 123,907 58.5
LMI 29,219 45,773 56.7
UI 97,245 153,691 58.0
-1
-1
Table Two shows that applications from all communities
increased significantly. Percentage increases ranged from 48.3
percent for UI individuals to 59.9 percent for LMI individuals. Two
subject communities outgrew their control communities: minority and
LMI individuals. Predominantly minority and LMI neighborhoods
did not, however, outgrow their control communities.
Table Three further expands on the Scorecard by showing the
actual number of residential real estate-related loans originated in
each subject community and control community in 1997 and 1998,
22 All percentages, denial rates, and denial rate ratios in the Scorecard are
rounded to the nearest tenth.
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the percentage increase, and the score:
Table Three
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE-RELATED LENDING
LOANS ORIGINATED AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
171 998 % CHANGE"--
APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS
Minority 25,735 41,171 60.0 +1
White 48,569 75,236 54.9
LMI 8,487 17,648 107.9 +1
Ul 54,999 82,786 50.5
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
80-100% Min. 17,150 33,314 94.3
0-19% Min. 48,256 76,865 59.3
LMI 11,234 21,920 95.1
UI 57,038 92,439 62.1
+1
+1
According to Table Three, residential real estate-related
lending increased significantly in each subject and control community
in 1998. Percentage increases ranged from 50.5 percent to UI persons
to 107.9 percent for LMI persons. Growth in loan originations in each
subject community outpaced growth in each corresponding control
community.
Table Four details changes in denial rate ratios from the
Scorecard. It depicts the denial rates and denial rate ratios for each
subject community in 1997 and 1998 and the score:23
23 As a reminder, the denial rate ratio is the denial rate for residential real
estate-related loan applications in a subject community divided by the denial rate in its
779
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Table Four
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE-RELATED LENDING
DENIAL RATE RATIOS
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
According to Table Four, the denial rate ratio decreased for
predominantly minority/predominantly White neighborhoods. It
remained the same for minority/White and LMI/UI individuals and
LMI/UI neighborhoods.
Focusing next on one of the subject communities - minority
individuals - HMDA data makes it possible to divide minority
individuals into four sub-groups - Native Americans, Asians/Pacific
Islanders, African-Americans, and Latinos - and to apply each of the
indicators for evaluating residential real estate-related lending to each
of these four groups. The results are depicted in Table Five:
control community. For example, if the denial rate for predominantly minority
neighborhoods is 20 percent and the denial rate for White neighborhoods is 10 percent,
the denial rate ratio is 2.
780
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Table Five
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE-RELATED LENDING
RACE OF APPLICANT
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
781
Native Americans 431 1,081 150.8 +1
Asians/Pacific
Islanders 9,361 14,599 56.0 +1
African-Americans 22,372 35,917 60.5 +1
Latinos 11,647 17,806 52.9 +1
Whites 70,911 108,381 52.8
LOANS ORIGINATED
Native Americans 216 572 164.8 +1
Asians/PacificIslanders 6,593 10,324 56.6 +1
African-Americans 12,203 19,866 62.8 + 1
Latinos 6,723 10,409 54.8 -1
Whites 48,569 1 75,236 1 54.9
DENIAL RATE RATIO
1997 19981
Native Americans 25.5 1.7 16.1 1.3 +1
AsasPcfc 14.4 1.0 12.3 1.0 0Islanders
African-Americans 25.5 1.7 21.2 1.7 0
Latinos 1 22.3 1.5 1 19.3 1.5 1 0
Of the four groups depicted in Table Five, Native Americans
20001
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fared the best, with a score of +3. Applications and loans more than
doubled and the denial rate ratio declined by nearly one-quarter.
Asians/Pacific Islanders were next with +2. Applications and loans
increased by half and the denial rate ratio held constant. African-
Americans were next at +1. Applications and loans increased by
more than half but the denial rate ratio also increased. Latinos scored
0. The percentage increase in applications from Latinos was slightly
higher than the application increase from Whites, loan originations
grew more slowly, and the denial rate ratio remained the same.
In conclusion, real estate-related lending grew for all
communities in the metropolitan area in 1998 and growth in the
subject communities was greater than growth in the control
communities, resulting in an overall score of +5. Among the subject
communities, minority and UI individuals did the best; among
minority individuals, Native Americans fared best.
B. Conventional Home Mortgage Lending
1. Methodology
This section examines one type of loan covered by HMDA:
24conventional home mortgage loans. This section evaluates
aggregate conventional home mortgage lending in the metropolitan
area in 1998 in the four subject communities according to the same
three indicators the previous section used to analyze all residential
24 The Scorecard examines conventional home mortgage lending in particular
because it is a "bellwether" loan. A conventional home mortgage loan represents a
significant financial stake for the lender and borrower. See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne
Passmore, The Role of Specialized Lenders in Extending Mortgages to Lower-Income and
Minority Homebuyers, 85 Fed. Res. Bull. 709, 710 (1999). Promoting homeownership
- especially among minorities - is a significant national social policy goal. See Bill
Dedman, Study Discerns Disadvantages for Blacks in Home Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1999, at 18. Finally, the demand for conventional home mortgage loans
compared to other loans in New York was relatively heavy in 1998. Applications for
conventional home mortgage loans constituted 31.5 percent of all HMDA-covered loan
applications in MSA 5600 in 1998, the second highest percentage. The other percentages
were federally insured - 3.3, refinance - 50.8, home improvement - 11.6, and multi-
family - 2.7. See supra note 12 for the source of this data.
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real estate-related lending. Applying these three indicators to the four
subject communities yields the same twelve indicators used in the
previous section.
2. Results
Table Six is the "Scorecard" for conventional home mortgage
lending in 1998 in the New York metropolitan area:
Table Six
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING SCORECARD
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
SUBJECT APPLICATIONS ORIGINATIONS DENIALRATE TOTALCOMMUNITY_ RATIO
Minority -1 -1 0 -2
Individuals
LMI Individuals +1 +1 +1 +3
Predominantly
Minority +1 +1 0 +2
Neighborhoods
LMI LI+1 +1 0 +2
Neighborhoods
Total +2 +2 +1 +5
As more fully elaborated in Tables Seven, Eight, and Nine,
the number of conventional home mortgage loan applications filed
and loans originated increased for all communities in 1998. The score
for conventional home mortgage lending in the subject communities
is +5, meaning that generally the increases in the four subject
communities were greater than in their corresponding control
communities in 1998, and denial rate ratios declined or remained
stable.
Among the subject communities, LMI individuals fared the
best, scoring +3. Application and lending growth was higher than in
UI neighborhoods and the denial rate ratio declined. Minority and
LMI neighborhoods were next at +2. Application and loan growth
was greater than in their control communities and the denial rate ratio
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI,
remained the same. Minority individuals did not fare well, receiving
a score of -2. The denial rate ratio remained the same, and
application and lending growth lagged behind Whites.
Table Seven expands on the Scorecard for conventional home
mortgage loans by showing the actual number of conventional home
mortgage loan applications each subject community and control
community submitted in 1997 and 1998, the percentage increase, and
the score:
Table Seven
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
1997 1998 % CHANGE +-
APPLICANT CHARA CTERISTICS
Minority 21,932 23,889 8.9 -1
White 41,348 46,945 13.5
LMI 6,950 10,084 45.1 +1
UI 47,294 52,627 11.3
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
80-100%
Min. 9,955 12,683 27.4
0-19% Min. 41,522 47,612 14.7
LMI 7,333 9,482 29.3
UI 49,002 56,775 15.9
+1
+1 1
Table Seven shows that total applications increased for all
communities. Percentage increases ranged from 8.9 percent for
minority applicants to 45.1 percent for LMI applicants. Three subject
communities - LMI individuals, LMI neighborhoods, and
784
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predominantly minority neighborhoods - enjoyed stronger growth
than their control communities. However, growth in applications
from minority applicants did not outgrow applications from Whites.
Table Eight provides additional information about the portion
of the -conyentional home mortgage loan Scorecard dealing with
originations. It shows the number of conventional home mortgage
loans originated in each subject community in 1997 and 1998, the
percentage increase, and the score:
Table Eight
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
LOANS ORIGINATED AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
1997 1998 % CHANGE -
APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS
Minority 14,386 15,344 6.7 -1
White 31,303 35,134 12.2
LMI 3,836 5,377 40.2 +1
Ul 34,571 37,211 7.6
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
80-100%
Min. 5,317 6,330
0-19% Min. 31,050 34,543 11.2
LMI 4,096 4,960 21.1
U1 36,065 40,796 13.1
Table Eight shows that the total number of conventional home
loan originations increased in all communities. Percentage increases
ranged from 6.7 percent for minority individuals to 40.2 percent for
LMI individuals. Except for minority individuals, growth in loan
20001
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originations in each subject community outpaced growth in its control
community.
Table Nine corresponds to the denial rate ratio section of the
conventional home mortgage loan Scorecard. It depicts the denial
rates and denial rate ratios for each subject community in 1.997 and
1998 as well as the score:
Table Nine
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
DENIAL RATE RATIOS
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
According to Table Nine, the conventional home mortgage
loan denial rate ratio decreased for all subject communities except for
LMI neighborhoods, where it remained the same, but the ratios are
high. The ratios for minority applicants (1.7) and predominantly
minority neighborhoods (2.0) are consistent with discrimination
25against those communities. However, the HMDA data that is the
source of this result is not sufficiently detailed to permit a definitive-
26
conclusion about discrimination. Nevertheless, the evidence of
25 See Marsico, supra note 6, at 516-18.
26 See id. at 516-17.
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discrimination is sufficiently strong to merit further investigation by
government agencies that have the authority to obtain the necessary
information.
27
Focusing next on one of the subject communities - minority
individuals - HMDA makes it possible to divide minority
individuals into four sub-groups - Native Americans, Asians/Pacific
Islanders, African-Americans, and Latinos - and to apply each of the
three indicators for evaluating conventional home mortgage lending to
each of these four groups. The results of this analysis are depicted in
Table Ten:
27 See id at 529.
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Table Ten
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
RACE OF APPLICANTS
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
1997 1998 % CHANGE -1-
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED
Native Americans 203 233 14.8 +1
Asians/Pacific
Islanders 6,677 7,477 12.0 -1
African-
Americans 9,029 9,724
Latinos 6,023 6,455 7.2 -1
Whites 41,348 46,945 13.5
LOANS ORIGINATED
Native Americans 121 137 13.2 +1
Asians/Pacific 5,151 5,773 12.1 -1
Islanders
African-
Americans 5,236 5,416
Latinos 3,878 4,018 3.6 -1
Whites 31,303 35,134 12.2
1997 DENIAL RATE RATIO
DENIAL RATE DENIALRATEIO DENIAL RATE DENIALRATEIO
Native Americans 26.1 2.3 20.6 1.9 +1
Asians/Pacific 10.2 0.9 9.7 0.9 0
Islanders
Americans 24.9 2.2 23.0 2.1 +1
Latinos 18.8 1.7 18.7 1.7 
Of the four groups depicted in Table Ten, Native Americans
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fared the best with a score of +3. Application and loan growth was
greater than for Whites and the denial rate ratio decreased. The three
remaining groups, however, received negative scores. All three
groups' application and lending growth were slower than for Whites.
African-Americans' denial rate ratio decreased, while the denial rate
ratio for Asians/Pacific Islanders and Latinos remained the same.
This resulted in scores of -1 for African-Americans and -2 for
Asians/Pacific Islanders and Latinos. Denial rate ratios for African-
Americans (2.1), Native Americans (1.9), and Latinos (1.7) were
consistent with discrimination, although not fully probative.
28
In conclusion, conventional home mortgage lending grew for
all communities in the metropolitan are in 1998, and growth in the
subject communities was greater than growth in the control
communities, resulting in an overall score of +5. Among the subject
communities, LMI individuals fared the best with +3, while minority
individuals fared poorly, with -2. Among minority individuals,
Native Americans received +3, while African-Americans, Latinos,
and Asians lagged behind Whites in application and lending growth.
In addition, denial rate ratios were consistent with discrimination for
minority individuals overall and African-Americans, Native
Americans, and Latinos in particular, and predominantly minority
neighborhoods.
C. Small Business Loan Originations
This last section of Part One examines the aggregate small
business lending record of all New York metropolitan area banks that
are required to report data about their small business lending under
the CRA.29 Due to limitations in the publicly available data, this
section examines only one subject community: LMI neighborhoods;
and one indicator: loan originations.30 This section's only indicator is
28 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 for a discussion of the meaning
of these denial rate ratios.
29 The source of data for this section is the FFIEC website (updated Mar. 2,
1999 and July 29, 1999) <http://www.ffiec.gov>. See supra note 12 for a description of
the reporting requirements.
30 The Scorecard does not evaluate small business lending in the other three
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thus:
*Percentage change in number of small business loans
in LMI neighborhoods from 1997 to 1998 compared to
the percentage change in UI neighborhoods.
As shown in Table Eleven, in 1998, the number of small
business loan originations increased from 1997 to 1998 in both LMI
and UI neighborhoods, and the percentage increase was greater in
LMI neighborhoods:
Table Eleven
SMALL BUSINESS LOAN ORIGINATIONS AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1997-1998
1997 198 % CHANGE +J-
LMI Neighborhoods 5,711 7,763 35.9 1 +1
UI Neighborhoods 18,331 23,791 1 29.8
The number of small
neighborhoods grew 35.9
neighborhoods.
business loan originations in LMI
percent compared to 29.8 percent in UI
subject communities or according to the other indicators that it uses to evaluate
residential real estate-lending and conventional home mortgage lending because the CRA
regulations do not require banks to report the number of small business applications they
receive; the race, gender, and income of small business loan applicants; or the racial
composition of the neighborhood in which the small business that sought the loan is
located. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.12 (u), 25.42 (a) (1999). Federal Reserve regulations
prohibit lenders from collecting information about the race of small business loan
applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (1999). The Federal Reserve is now considering a
regulation that would permit lenders to collect such data. See Press Release, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (released Aug. 4, 1999), available at (visited
April 20, 2000) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.usiboarddocs/press/boardacts/1999/19990804/>.
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II. CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LENDING BY INDIVIDUAL LENDERS
IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
This section evaluates the conventional home mortgage
lending record of the 154 lenders in the New York metropolitan area
31that made at least 30 conventional home mortgage loans in 1998.
This section examines each lender's conventional home mortgage
lending record to the four subject communities: minority persons;
LMI persons; predominantly minority neighborhoods; and LMI
neighborhoods.
This section evaluates each lender's conventional home
mortgage lending record to these four communities by using five
indicators. These indicators are designed to do two things. The first
three indicators compare each lender's record in each subject
community to the record for all lenders combined in the MSA in each
subject community. The fourth and fifth indicators compare each
lender's record in each subject community to its own record in each
control community. The five indicators are:
*Percentage of conventional home mortgage loan
applications received: This indicator compares the
percentage of conventional home mortgage loan
applications the lender received from each subject
community to the percentage of conventional home
mortgage applications each subject community
submitted to all lenders combined in the metropolitan
area.
*Percentage of conventional home mortgage loans
originated: This indicator compares the percentage of
the lender's conventional home mortgage loans
originated to each subject community to the
percentage of conventional home mortgage loans all
lenders combined originated to each subject
31 The source of this data is the FFIEC. As described supra note 1, the data
in this section was analyzed with a computer program Vicki Hurewitz created in
cooperation with the author.
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community in the metropolitan area.
*Conventional home mortgage loan application
denial rate ratio: This indicator compares the
lender's denial rate ratio on conventional home
mortgage loan applications for each subject
community to the denial rate ratio for each subject
community for all lenders combined in metropolitan
area.
*Market share of conventional home mortgage
loan applications: This indicator compares the
lender's market share of conventional home mortgage
loan applications in each subject community to the
lender's'market share of conventional home mortgage
loan applications in each subject community's control
community.
*Market share of. conventional home mortgage
loan originations: This indicator measures each
lender's market share of conventional home mortgage
loan originations in each subject community to its
market share of conventional home mortgage loan
originations in each subject community's control
community.
Applying each of the five indicators to each of the four subject
communities yields twenty indicators for evaluating conventional
home mortgage lending for each lender:
1. Percentage of applications from minority
persons: the percentage of the lender's applications
from minority persons compared to the percentage of
all applications in the metropolitan area from minority
persons.
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2. Percentage of applications from LMI persons:
the percentage of the lender's applications from LMI
persons compared to the percentage of all applications
in the metropolitan area from LMI persons.
3. Percentage of applications for loans to purchase
property in predominantly minority
neighborhoods: the percentage of the lender's
applications for loans to purchase property in
predominantly minority neighborhoods compared to
the percentage of all applications in the metropolitan
area for loans to purchase property in predominantly
minority neighborhoods.
4. Percentage of applications for loans to purchase
property in LMI neighborhoods: the percentage of
all the lender's applications for loans to purchase
property in LMI neighborhoods compared to the
percentage of all applications in the metropolitan area
for loans to purchase property in LMI neighborhoods.
5. Percentage of loan originations to minority
persons: the percentage of the lender's loan
originations to minority persons compared to the
percentage of all loan originations in the metropolitan
area to minority persons.
6. Percentage of loan originations to LMI persons:
the percentage of the lender's loan originations to LMI
persons compared to the percentage of all loan
originations in the metropolitan area to LMI persons.
7. Percentage of loan originations to purchase
property in predominantly minority
neighborhoods: the percentage of the lender's loan
originations to purchase property in predominantly
minority neighborhoods compared to the percentage
20001 793
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of all originations in the metropolitan area to purchase
property in predominantly minority neighborhoods.
8. Percentage of loan originations to purchase
property in LMI neighborhoods: the percentage of
the lender's loan originations to purchase property in
LMI neighborhoods compared to the percentage of all
originations in the ,metropolitan area to purchase
property in LMI neighborhoods.
9. Denial rate ratio - minority/White applicants:
the lender's denial rate ratio for minority/White loan
applicants compared to the metropolitan area
minority/White applicant denial rate ratio.
10. Denial rate ratio - LMI/UI applicants: the
lender's denial rate ratio for LMI/UI loan applicants
compared to the metropolitan area LMI/UI applicant
denial rate ratio.
11. Denial rate ratio - predominantly
minority/predominantly White neighborhoods: the
lender's denial rate ratio for predominantly
minority/predominantly White neighborhoods
compared to the metropolitan area predominantly
minority/predominantly White neighborhood denial
rate ratio.
12. Denial rate ratio - LMI/UI neighborhoods:
the lender's denial rate ratio for LMIXI
neighborhoods compared to the metropolitan area
LMI/UI neighborhood denial rate ratio.
13. Market share of applications - minority
persons: the lender's market share of applications
from minority persons compared to its market share of
applications from White persons.
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14. Market share of applications - LMI persons:
the lender's market share of applications from LMI
persons compared to its market share of applications
from UI persons.
15. Market share of applications - property in
predominantly minority neighborhoods: the
lender's market share of applications for loans to
purchase property in predominantly minority
neighborhoods compared to its market share of
applications for loans to purchase property in
predominantly White neighborhoods.
16. Market share of applications - property in
LMI neighborhoods: the lender's market share of
applications for loans to purchase property in LMI
neighborhoods compared to its market share of
applications for loans to purchase property in UI
neighborhoods.
17. Market share of loan originations - minority
persons: the lender's market share of loan
originations to minority persons compared to its
market share of loan originations to White persons.
18. Market share of loan originations - LMI
persons: the lender's market share of loan
originations to LMI persons compared to its market
share of loan originations to UI persons.
19. Market share of loan originations - property
in predominantly minority neighborhoods: The
lender's market share of loan originations in
predominantly minority neighborhoods compared to
its market share of loan originations in White
neighborhoods.
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20. Market share of loan originations - property
in LMI neighborhoods: The lender's market share of
loan originations in LMI neighborhoods compared to
its market share of loan originations in UI
neighborhoods.
This section assigns a score to each lender's record for each of
these twenty indicators using methodology similar to Part One. If a
lender's percentage of applications from or loans to a subject
community is higher than the metropolitan area percentage for all
lenders, it receives +1; if its percentage is lower, the lender receives -
1. If the lender's market share of applications from or loans to a
subject community is higher than its control community, the lender
receives +1. The lender receives -1 for a smaller market share in a
subject community. If the lender's denial rate ratio for a subject
community is higher than the metropolitan area denial rate ratio, it
receives -1; it receives +1 if its denial rate ratio is lower. The same
percentage, market share, or denial rate ratio earns a 0. For example,
if 15 percent of a lender's conventional home mortgage loans are to
LMI persons and 12 percent of all loans by all lenders in the
metropolitan area are to LMI persons, the lender will receive +1. If
the lender's market share of applications in predominantly minority
neighborhoods is one percent and its market share of applications in
predominantly White neighborhoods is .5 percent, the lender will
receive +1 as well. If its denial rate ratio for minority persons is
lower than the metropolitan area denial rate ratio, it will also receive
+1. The Scorecard tabulates each lender's score for all indicators,
assigns a point total, and ranks each lender accordingly.
Table Twelve is the "Scorecard" for individual lenders.
32
32 The numbers and score for each of the twenty criteria for each of the 154
lenders are available from the author.
The Scorecard identifies a lender as a bank based on the lender's name: if the
name contains "Bank" or an abbreviation for "Bank," the Scorecard identifies the entity
as a bank. If a lender's name raised an issue about whether it was a bank, its status was
confirmed by using various searches available on the FFIEC's website. See
<http://www.ffiec.gov>. Table 12 identifies lenders that are banks with a "B" following
the name of the lender. Among the non-bank lenders are mortgage companies not
affiliated with banks, credit unions, and trust companies. The Scorecard identifies
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Table Twelve
CONVENTIONAL HOME MORTGAGE LOAN SCORECARD
INDIVIDUAL LENDERS - THIRTY OR MORE LOANS
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
1998
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RANKING LENDER LOANS PERCENT SCORE
OF ALL
I LOANS
1 THE MORTGAGE 109 0.18% 20MONEY CENTER
1 REPUBLIC
1_ . NATIONAL BANKB 49 0.08% 20
RESOURCE
1 BANCSHARES 173 0.29% 20
MTG. GROUP
1 THE ASSOCIATES 90 0.15% 20
VANDERBILT
MORTGAGEM 117 0.20% 18
FLEET NATIONAL
5 BANK B  209 0.35% 18
LONG BEACH
5 MORTGAGE 81 0.14% 18
COMPANYS
IMC MORTGAGE 35 0.06% 18
COMPANYS
AMERITRUST
5 NATIONAL 126 0.21% 18
MORTGAGE
CARVER FEDERAL 32 0.05% 18
SAVINGS BANK" 32_0.05%_18
BUDGET
11 MORTGAGE 43 0.07% 16
BANKERS
GREEN TREE 68 0.12% 16
FINANCIAL m  68_0_12%_16
ACCREDITED
11___ HOME LENDERSS 38 0.06% 16
CONSUMER HOME 153 0.26% 16
MORTGAGE
subprime lenders with an "S" following the lender's name. 1It identifies lenders that
specialize in making loans to purchase manufactured homes - homes constructed in a
factory and assembled on-site - with an "M" following the lender's name. The source of
the Scorecard's information used to identify subprime and manufactured home lenders is
a study by a researcher at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
See Randall M. Scheessele, 1998 HMDA HIGHLIGHTS, at tbl. D.5b (Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., Office of Pol'y Dev. & Research, Working Paper No. HF-009 1999).
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
LOANS
AMERICAN
11 CAPITAL MTGE. 170 0.29% 16
BANKERS
MID-ISLAND
11____ EQUITIES CORP. 129 0.22% 16
UNITED NATIONAL
MORTGAGE' 31 0.05% 16
GOLDEN NATIONAL
MORTGAGES 614 1.04% 16
11 SUPERIOR BANK' 467 0.79% 16
WMC MORTGAGE 145 0.25% 161 CORP.s
DELTA FUNDING
CORPORATIONS 176 0.30% 16
1ST REPUBLIC
11 MORTGAGE 260 0.44% 16
BANKERS
CHINATOWN FED.
SAVINGS BANK 8  49 0.08% 16
11 FHB FUNDING 507 0.86% 16
CORP.$ 507_0.86%_16
25 UFSB OFINDIANAPOLIS6  380 0.64% 14
25 MUTUAL OF
NORTH AMERICA 46 0.08% 14
INDYMAC
27 MORTGAGE 1,327 2.25% 12
HOLDINGS
27 COUNTRYWIDEHOME LOANS 867 1.47% 12
27 OCWEN FINANCIAL
27____ SERVICES8  33 0.06% 12
RESIDENTIAL
27 FUNDING 297 0.50% 12
CORPORATION
PREMIER
27 MORTGAGE 81 0.14% 12
BANKING CORP.
27 CONTIMORTGAGECORPORATION S  32 0.05% 12
27 UNITED27____ MORTGAGE CORP. 30 0.05% 12
27 GREEN POINT 1,659 2.81% 1227_____ BANK8'S 1,659_2_81%_12
27 OCWEN FEDERAL 33 0.06% 12BANK FSB3's
27 PMCC MORTGAGE 333 0.56% 1227____ CORP.s 333 0.56% 12
27 MUNICIPAL CREDIT 0.08% 12UNION 49_0.08%_12
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
LOANS
27 PARKWAYMORTGAGEs 121 020% 12
27 ABFS INC.5 53 0.09% 12
40 FIRST TOWN40 FIS ON33 0.06% 10
MORTGAGE CORP.
40 ROSLYN NATIONAL 253 0.43% 10
MORTGAGE CORP.
40 CFS BANK' 658 1.11% 10
40 CENTEX CREDIT 64 0.11% 10
CORPORATION$
ISLAND
40 MORTGAGE 139 0.24% 10
NETWORK
CHASE
46 MANHATTAN 1,067 1.81% 8
MORTGAGE CORP.
PARMANN
46 MAGE 90 0.15% 8MORTGAGE
ABACUS FEDERAL46 SAVINGS BANKB 328 0.56% 8
MORTGAGE
46 LENDING OF 133 0.23% 8
AMERICA
46 ASSURANCE 33 0.06% 8
MORTGAGE
WALL STREET
46 MORTGAGE 331 0.56% 8
BANKERS
46 NATIONAL CITY 38 0.06% 8
JAMAICA SAVINGS
46 BANK B 39 0.07% 8
FINANCIAL
46 FEDERAL SAVINGS 72 0.12% 8
FSB a
EQUICREDIT
46 CORP. OF 63 0.11% 8
AMERICAs
ALLIANCE
46 MORTGAGE 206 0.35% 8
BANKING CORP.
EXECUTIVE
57 MORTGAGE 114 0.19% 6
BANKERS
SAXON NATIONAL
57 MORTGAGE 110 0.19% 6
BANKER
MORTGAGE57 MOTAE87 0.15% 1 6
DEPOT CORP.
GREENPOINT
60 MORTGAGE 219 0.37% 4
CORP. s
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
I_ _ LOANS
BARNETT
60 MORTGAGE 200 0.34% 4
COMPANY
NORTH FORK60 BANK B 296 0.50% 4
NATIONAL CITY
60 MORTGAG CORP 142 0.24% 4E CORP.
MASPETH
60 FEDERAL SAVINGS 324 0.55% 4
& LOAN B
60 OLYMPIA60 OYPA104 0.18% 4
MORTGAGE CORP.
67 CONTINENTAL 131 0.22% 2CAPITAL CORP.
BANCO POPULAR67 DE PUERTO RICOB 289 0.49% 2
67 FLEET BANK 37 0.06% 2
MORTGAGE.
67 PLUSEQUITY & 113 0.19% 2
LOANs
REPUBLIC
67 CONSUMER- 2,393 4.05% 2
LENDING GRP.
OPTION ONE
67 MORTGAGE 30 0.05% 2
CORPORATIONs
IMPERIAL HOME 31 0.05% 0
73_ LOANSs
HOMECOMINGS
73 FINANCIAL 98 0.17% 0
NETWORK
MELLON
73 MORTGAGE 330 0.56% 0
_COMPANY
76 NVR MORTGAGE 35 0.06% -2
FINANCE
CHASE
77 MANHATTAN 7,144 12.10% -4
BANK'
REPUBLIC
77 BANCORP 44 0.07% -4
MORTGAGE INC.
CROSS COUNTY 41 0.07% -4
77 FEDERAL S.B.
77 FIRST UNION 633 1.07% 4
MORTGAGE CORP.
FIRST NATIONAL
77 FUNDING 57 0.10% -4
CORPORATION
SLEEPY HOLLOW
77 NATIONAL BANKB 33 0.06% -4
800
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
LOANS
77 PREMIER
NATIONAL BANKB 51 0.09% -4
77 SOURCE ONE 39 0.07% -4
MORTGAGE
FLATBUSH
77 FEDERAL 32 0.05% -4
SAVINGSB
DIME SAVINGS
86 BANK OF NEW 2,043 3.46% -6
YORK B
BRUCHA
86 MORTGAGE 365 0.62% -6
BANKERS CORP.
FIRST
86 NATIONWIDE 66 0.11% -6
MORTGAGE CORP
86 FT MORTGAGE 57 0.10% -6
COMPANIES
90 UNFCU 164 0.28% -8
NATIONAL
90 STANDARD 363 0.61% -8
MORTGAGE CORP.
90 THE BANK OF NEW 976 1.66% -8
YORK MTG. CO.
NORTH AMERICAN
90 MORTGAGE 205 0.35% -8
COMPANY
NORTHFIELD
94____ SAVINGS BANK B 135 0.23% -10
94 LYONS MORTGAGE 189 0.32% -10
SERVICES
94 NORWEST 108 0.18% -10
FUNDING
FIRST UNION
94____ NATIONAL BANK B 46 0.08% -10
POLISH & SLAVIC 93 0.16% -10
FCU
94 PROVIDENT BANKS 252 0.43% -10
ROOSEVELT100 SAVINGS BANK B 375 0.63% -12
ULSTER SAVINGS100 BANK B 123 0.21% -12
100 SMITH-HAVENMORTGAGE CORP.
100 THE MAHOPACNATIONAL BANKB 86 0.15% -12
100 PUTNAM COUNTY100____ SAVINGS BANK B 101 0.17% -12
MORTGAGE100 ACCESS CORP. 74 0.13% -12
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
LOANS
IBJ WHITEHALL
100 BANK&TRUST 79 0.13% -12
CO.B
100 CHEVY CHASE 62 0.10% -12
MORTGAGE LINE
100 FINANCIL CORP.46 0.08% -12FINANCIAL .
100 WEBSTER BANK" 81 0.14% -12
10 BANK OF AMERICA100 AN1,219 2.06% -12
100 THE BANK OF NEWY0 RK B 87 0.15% -12
SOUND FEDERAL
100 S. & L. 46 0.08% -12
ASSOCIATION 8
100 OHIO SAVINGSBANK B 68 0.12% -12
COMMUNITY
100 MUTUAL SAVINGS 45 0.08% -12
BK. B
STERLING
115 NATIONAL MTG. 266 0.45% -14
CO.
CHASE
115 MANHATTAN BANK 40 0.07% -14
_USA 8
115 NORWEST
MORTGAGE 2,835 4.80% -14
US TRUST
115 COMPANY OF NEW 168 0.28% -14
YORK6
115 FLEET MORTGAGE 410 0.69% -14
CORPORATION
115 ALBANK u 46 0.08% -14
FIRST BANKERS
115 MORTGAGE 61 0.10% -14
SERVICE
115 GMAC MORTGAGE 221 0.37% -14
115 FLUSHINGSAVINGS BANK 92 0.16% -14
115 BANK OF THEHUDSON 8 32 0.05% -14
115 ASTORIA115___ FEDERASAVINGS B 1,659 2.81% -14
126 HOMERICAMORTGAGE CORP. 240 0.41% -16
126 OVUS FINANCIAL 35 0.06% -16CORPORATION
16 1ST 2ND
126 MOTGAG 60 0.10% -16RTGA E CO. NJ
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
I LOANS
126 CENDANT 1,042 1.76% -16
26 TEMPLE-INLAND _ 44_0.07% LAN
16 MORTGAGE CO..4 .7 1
16 STATEN ISLAND
SAVINGS BANK a 1,188 2.01% -16
126 FLAGSTAR BANK5 756 1.28% -16
BOSTON SAFE
126 DEPOSIT & TRUST 291 0.49% -16
CO.B
INDEPENDENCE
126 COMMUNITY BANK 409 0.69% -16
B
EMIGRANT
126 MORTGAGE 798 1.35% -16
COMPANY
126 UNION STATE 75 0.13% -16
BANK B
RICHMOND
126 COUNTY SAVINGS 491 0.83% -16
BANK B
PNC MORTGAGE
126 CORP. OF 178 0.30% -16
AMERICA
139 MERRILL LYNCH 367 0.62% -18CREDIT CORP.
MICHAEL STRAUSS139 INC. 1,728 2.93% -18
139 M&T MORTGAGE 670 1.13% -18CORPORATION
139 CITIBANK' 2,210 3.74% -18
19 COLUMBIA139 UMI 441 0.75% -18EQUITIES __________
GE CAPITAL
139 MORTGAGE 305 0.52% -18
SERVICES
THE YONKERS
139 SAVINGS AND 189 0.32% -18
LOANB
APPLE BANK FOR139 SAVINGS B 262 0.44% -18
139 HUDSON VALLEY 58 0.10% -18BANK 5  _ 58 0.10% -18
139 WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK 1,412 2.39% -18
139 THE WARWICK
SAVINGS B 73 0.12% -18
139 STANDARD
FEDERAL BANKS 420 0.71% -18
EAB MORTGAGE
COMPANY 1,005 1.70% -18
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Table Twelve continued
PERCENT
RANKING LENDER LOANS OF ALL SCORE
LOANS
MARINE MIDLAND152 MORTGAGE CORP. 1,626 2.75% -20
152 CITICORP 1,110 1.88% -201 MORTGAGE INC.
152 RIDGEWOOD152 SAVINGS BANK B 190 0.32% -20
57,333 97.08
The Scorecard contains many interesting results, both in the
aggregate and for particular lenders. The first significant result is that
there are more non-bank lenders than banks among the 154 lenders in
the Scorecard and these non-bank lenders made more conventional
home mortgage loans than banks. Of the 154 lenders, 57, or 37
percent, are banks. The remaining 97 lenders, or 63 percent, are non-
bank lenders. Banks made 27,131, or 47.3 percent of all loans
covered in the Scorecard, while non-bank lenders made 30,202, or
52.7 percent of the loans in the Scorecard.
Second, of the 154 lenders, 22 are "subprime" lenders and two
specialize in making loans to purchase manufactured homes.
Subprime lenders specialize in making higher-priced loans to
borrowers with less than "A" rated credit, the so-called "subprime"
market.33 Manufactured home lenders, who. lend money to purchase
manufactured homes, primarily serve minority and LMI
communities. 34  Subprime and manufactured home lenders made
5,075, or 8.9 percent, of the loans covered in the Scorecard. Of the 24
subprime and manufactured home lenders, three were banks and the
rest were non-bank lenders. Although subprime lending serves an
33 See Scheessele, supra note 32, at 12; Canner & Passmore, supra note 24,
at 709, 715-16; Dedman, supra note 24; Katharine Fraser, Revised Fair-Lending Exams
Include Subprime and Auto, AM. BANKER, Sept. 14, 1999, at 2; Daniel Wise, State
Agencies Finally Reach Pact Over Lender Abuse, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1999, at 1.
34 See Canner & Passmore, supra note 24, at 709, 718, 721. Although
manufactured home lenders are not necessarily "subprime" lenders, manufactured home
loans are deemed riskier than other home mortgage loans and borrowers tend to have
weaker credit histories and fewer resources. Id. at 713. Therefore, the analysis in the
Scorecard combines subprime and manufactured home lenders into one group.
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important function by providing credit to people with imperfect credit
histories, it is also subject to abusive practices. 35 Several subprime
lenders have been accused of "predatory lending," using high-pressure
sales tactics to induce vulnerable borrowers to agree to
unconscionable credit terms.36 These include high interest rates,
negative amortization, hidden fees and penalties, and balloon
payments, and frequently result in a higher than average rate of
foreclosure.37  Subprime lenders have also been accused of
discriminatory lending practices, including charging subprime
minority borrowers higher rates and fees than subprime White
borrowers and not making prime credit available to qualified minority
borrowers.38 Predatory lending has recently received much attention
by government officials and community advocates, who have
undertaken several initiatives to challenge it.
39
35 Letter from John A. Joyce, Secretary of the New York State Banking
Board, to Each Institution Addressed 2 (Dec. 28, 1999); Canner & Passmore, supra note
24, at 751; Dedman, supra note 24.
36 See Dedman, supra note 24; Heather Timmons, Subprime Lender Delta
Agrees to $6M Settlement with New York Attorney General, AM. BANKER, June 24, 1999,
at 28; Wise, supra note 33.
37 See Dedman, supra note 24; Timmons, supra note 36.
38 Randy Kennedy, Home Lender Settles Suit Over Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 2000, at B1; Raun J. Rasmussen, Predatory Lending Litigation Update, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 17, 2000, at 1; Use of Race to Target Communities for Unfair Loans is Illegal,
Lending that Makes Housing 'Unavailable' Violates FHAct, INSIDE MORTGAGE
COMPLIANCE, Apr. 3, 2000, at 2.
39 See NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEP'T, PROPOSED NEW PART 41
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON HIGH COST HOME LOANS, Dec. 28, 1999; Canner &
Passmore, supra note 24, at 717 (capital standards tightened for subprime lenders);
Robert M. Jaworski & Timothy J. Byrne, Tough Policies on New York Mortgage Lenders
Take Shape, BANKING L. J. 624 (1999) (citing laws in North Carolina and Minnesota and
proposed regulations and legislation in New York and Illinois restricting predatory
lending); Dean Anason, Democrats Hit 'Predators' in Three Bills, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13,
2000, at 1; Dean Anason & Kevin Guerrero, Too Much or Not Enough? HUD Joins
Lending Fray, AM. BANKER, Mar. 31, 2000, at 1; Draft Plan to Require Higher Capital
for Subprime Loans, INSIDE MORTGAGE COMPLIANCE, Oct. 25, 1999, at 5; Fed Chief Sees
Abuses in Loans to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at C13; Fraser, supra note 33;
Rob Garver, Regulators Talk Tough But Have Few Options In Predatory Loan Fight,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 3; Rob Garver, Greenspan Wades In On Predatory
Lending, Joining Other Regulators, AM. BANKER, Mar. 23, 2000, at 2; Rob Garver,
FDIC: CRA Exams to Target Predatory Lenders, AM. BANKER, February 18, 2000, at 20;
'Free State' Lawmakers Ponder Anti-Predatory Bill, INSIDE MORTGAGE COMPLIANCE,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Third, non-bank lenders outperformed banks in lending to
LMI and minority applicants and neighborhoods. Of the 154 lenders,
75 (48.7 percent) received a score of 0 or higher. The remaining 79
lenders (51.3 percent) received lower than 0. Non-bank lenders were
overrepresented among the lenders that received 0 or higher, while
banks were underrepresented. Although non-bank lenders constituted
63 percent of all lenders, 78.7 percent of all lenders with 0 or higher
were non-bank lenders. More than half- 60.8 percent - of all non-
bank lenders, a total of 59 lenders, received 0 or higher. On the other
hand, banks comprised 37 percent of all lenders in the Scorecard, but
only 21.3 percent of all lenders with a score of 0 or higher.4 ° Only 16,
or 28.1 percent of all banks received a 0 or higher. Conversely, banks
were overrepresented among the lenders that received less than 0 and
non-bank lenders were underrepresented. Although banks were 37
percent of all lenders, they represented 51.9 percent of all lenders with
less than 0. On the other hand, non-bank lenders were 63 percent of
all lenders but only 48.1 percent of all lenders with a score of less
than 0. Similarly, 41, or 71.9 percent, of all banks received less than
0, while 38, or 39.2 percent, of all non-bank lenders received less than
0.
Fourth, subprime and manufactured home lenders
outperformed bank and non-bank lenders in conventional home
mortgage lending to the subject communities. All 24 subprime and
manufactured home lenders received a score of 0 or higher,
representing 32 percent of all lenders with a score of 0 or higher, even
though subprime lenders constituted only 15.6 percent of all lenders
Apr. 3, 2000, at 8; Michele Heller, Call-Report Overhaul Plan To Add Subprime Loan
Data, AM. BANKER, March 30, 2000, at 2; Diana B. Henriques, Congress and Regulators
Start Efforts to Crack Down on Deceptive Lending Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000,
at 25; HMDA Change Aimed at Exposing Predatory Lending, INSIDE MORTGAGE
COMPLIANCE, Apr. 3, 2000, at 6; Randy Kennedy, Home Lender Settles Suit Over Fees,
N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2000, at B1; National Campaign Targets Predatory Lenders,
Two-Tier Banking, ACORN REPORT, December 1999, at 1; Ordinance Declares Chicago
Off-Limits to Loan Predators, INSIDE MORTGAGE COMPLIANCE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 4;
Timmons, supra note 36.
0 Three of the banks with scores of "0" or higher are also identified as
subprime lenders. Combined, these lenders made 2,159, or 43.9 percent of the 4,921
loans made by banks with scores of "0" or higher.
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in the Scorecard. Subprime lenders made 5,075 loans, or 28 percent
41
of all loans made by lenders with a score of 0 or higher.
Finally, large lenders did not fare as well as smaller lenders in
the rankings. The 75 lenders with positive scores made 18,133 loans,
an average of 242 loans per lender. The 79 lenders with negative
scores made 39,200 loans, an average of 496 loans per lender.
Several large banks and mortgage companies did not fare well in the
rankings. As shown below, the large majority of lenders with one
percent or more of the market share of conventional home mortgage
loans received a score of less than zero:
LENDER SHARE OF LOANS (%) ] SCORE RANKING
GOLDEN NATIONAL MORTGAGE 1.04 16 11
INDYMAC MORTGAGE HOLDINGS 2.25 12 27
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS 1.47 12 27
GREENPOINT BANK 2.81 12 27
CFS BANK 1.11 10 40
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE 1.81 8 46
CORP.
REPUBLIC CONSUMER LENDING 4.05 2 67
GROUP
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK 12.1 -4 77
FIRST UNION MORTGAGE CORP. 1.07 -4 77
DIME SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK 3.46 -6 86
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MORTGAGE 1.68 -8 90
CO.
BANK OF AMERICA 2.06 -12 100
NORWEST MORTGAGE 4.8 -14 115
ASTORIA FEDERAL SAVINGS 2.81 -14 115
CENDANT MORTGAGE 1.76 -16 126
STATEN ISLAND SAVINGS BANK 2.01 -16 126
FLAGSTAR BANK 1.28 -16 126
EMIGRANT MORTGAGE CO. 1.35 -16 126
MICHAEL STRAUSS, INC. 2.93 -18 139
M&T MORTGAGE CORP. 1.13 -18 139
CITIBANK 3.74 -18 139
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 2.39 -18 139
EAB MORTGAGE CO. 1.7 -18 139
MARINE MIDLAND MORTGAGE CORP. 2.75 -20 152
CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC. 1.88 -20 152
Of the 25 lenders listed, 18 received scores of less than 0. Together,
41 This likely understates the amount of subprime lending in the subject
communities, as the Scorecard only counts as subprime loans those loans made by
subprime lenders. Limitations in HMDA data make it impossible to track subprime
lending by lenders that are essentially prime market lenders. See Canner & Passmore,
supra note 24, at 719.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
these lenders -controlled 51 percent of the conventional home
mortgage loan market in the metropolitan area.
CONCLUSION
The following are five significant conclusions from the 1998
New York Metropolitan Area Lending Scorecard. First, 1998 was a
year of significant growth for residential real estate-related lending,
conventional home mortgage lending, and small business lending in
the New York metropolitan area. Overall, lending growth in the
subject communities outpaced lending growth in control
communities. Second, despite this overall growth, with the exception
of Native Americans, conventional home mortgage lending to
individual minority groups did not grow as quickly as conventional
home mortgage lending to Whites. Third, there is evidence of
discrimination against minorities and predominantly minority
neighborhoods in the conventional home mortgage loan market.
Fourth, subprime lenders outperformed banks and non-bank lenders in
the subject communities. Finally, large banks and mortgage
companies did no fare well in the Scorecard.
These conclusions have several policy implications. Given
the alleged abusive lending practices engaged in by some subprime
lenders, community activists and government officials must act now
to prevent the perpetuation of a two-tiered lending system in which
LMI and minority borrowers have only high-priced, possibly
predatory and discriminatory loans available to them. These actions
include monitoring and identifying predatory lenders and predatory
lending practices, protesting predatory practices, bringing court
challenges against predatory practices, and supporting regulatory and
legislative efforts to make it easier to detect and counteract predatory
lending practices. The sub-par performance by large lenders is related
to the spread of subprime lending in the subject communities, as the
absence of such lenders in the subject communities creates a market
opportunity for subprime lenders. Working to improve the lending
performance of these large lenders would perhaps displace some of
the subprime lending in the subject communities. One opportunity for
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large lenders to improve is with minority individuals, who did not fare
well in the conventional home mortgage loan market. Finally,
government agencies with fair lending jurisdiction over lenders,
including HUD, The Federal Reserve, and the New York State
Banking Department, should use their authority to investigate the
evidence of lending discrimination and take any necessary steps to
stop it.

